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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ROTTER'S LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE AND KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

JOHN MARTIN EBY

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ROTTER'S LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE AND KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT submitted by John Martin Eby in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

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ABSTRACT

This research attempted to explore the relationships between Rotter's Locus of Control Scale and moral judgement. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental scale was selected to measure moral judgement. Kohlberg's and Rotter's scales were then given to two separate samples of high school students to determine if there was a relationship between the two scales. From the claims made by researchers, in regard to the two scales, it was hypothesized that a relationship would be found. As the majority of previous research indicated the positive nature of Rotter's concept of "internality", it was expected that people scoring high on the internal dimension of Rotter's scale would also score high in terms of moral judgement (i.e. a higher Kohlberg stage).

As it turned out, there was no significant relationships between the two scales. This raised questions as to the theoretical basis of these scales. It also raised questions as to whether Rotter's claim, that more "internal" members of society are needed, was premature.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1966, Julian B. Rotter wrote:

> The effects of reinforcement of preceding behaviour depend in part on whether the person perceives the reward as contingent on his own behaviour or independent of it. Acquisition and performance differ in situations perceived as determined by skill versus chance. Persons may also differ in generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement.

Rotter has used his construct in two different ways. One way was to set-up a situation in which the subject was reinforced for performing a task. The reinforcement was designed to appear to the subject as either contingent upon his actions (internal locus of control) or as not contingent upon his actions (external locus of control).

For example, in a study by Phares (1957, in Rotter 1966), he used colour matching as an ambiguous task and instructed half of the subjects that the task was based on luck and the other half that the task was based on skill. After each task the subjects placed bets on how many coloured disks they had correctly matched. A fixed order of partial reinforcement was used with both groups of subjects. The results were as hypothesized; subjects who were told that the task was due to their skill made significantly higher bets after reinforcement, than those subjects who were told that the task was due to chance. Conversely, subjects who were told that the task was due to their skill made significantly lower bets when they had not been reinforced the

previous time, than those subjects who were told that the task was due to chance. From this study and others by Phares, James and Rotter, Rotter (1966) concludes that people perform differently, according to whether they perceive reinforcement as being dependent on their skill or as being dependent on chance.

The second way in which Rotter has used his construct was to measure a person's "internal-external" orientation using a 29 item forced choice scale. This use of the scale was based on the hypothesis that people have relatively stable tendencies to view their satisfactions in life as either being under their own control ("Internal" locus of control) or as being under the control of some outside force ("external" locus of control).

In experiments using Rotter's scale, the subjects were typically divided into an "external" group and an "internal" group. These groups were then compared on some other dimension to see if there were any significant relationships. The division point for the internal-external groups was usually taken as the median of the sample distribution. Thus what was "internal" in one sample may not have been "internal" in another sample.

The results have been variable. The early results seem to indicate the negative nature of "externality" and the positive nature of "internality" (Janzen and Beeken, 1973). Rotter (1966) states that "internals" as compared to "externals" are:

(a) more alert to their environment for uses which will provide useful information for the future.

(b) take steps to improve their environmental conditions.

(c) place greater value on skill and achievement.

(d) are resistant to subtle manipulation.

These statements are summaries of earlier research.

There are also tales studies which seem to indicate the "positive" nature of "internality." Julian, Lichtman, and Ryckman (1968) found that "internals" prefer circumstances under which they can exert greater control over the outcome. Penk (1969) found that children employing verbally mature abstractions tended to be more internal. Adams-Webber (1969) found that "internals" had more internalized moral sanctions (such as a sense of guilt) than "externals" who reacted more to external contingencies. Clouser and Hjelle (1970) report to have found a significant relationship between dogmatism and external control. Also, Phares, Wilson and Klyver (1971) report that under non-distractive conditions "internals" are significantly less likely to blame themselves or others for failure.

Internals are also described (Rotter, 1971) as surer of themselves, confident that they can control themselves and their destinies, better educated, more readily able to quit smoking, and richer. Externals are described (Rotter, 1971) as feeling they are controlled by powerful others, docile and suspicious.

Other research, however, has not borne out these statements concerning the positive nature of "internality". Rotter (1966) failed to predict petition signing in two cases based on I-E scores. Goss and Morosko (1970) found that alcoholics were more internal. Battle

and Rotter (1963) found that among lower class Negro children, the more intelligent tended to be more external. Dulette and Wolk (1972) repeated Battle and Rotter's study (1963) and found similar results; that is the more intelligent lower class Negro children were more external, the less intelligent Negro children were more internal. Efran (1963) found that among high school students, the tendency to repress failures was significantly related to internality.

Finally, in a study of teacher behaviour, Janzen, Beeken and Hritzuk (1973) found "external" teachers endorsed student autonomy significantly more than "internal" teachers. In a summary of recent literature, Janzen and Beeken (1973) state:

> And it certainly is possible to contend that an external locus of control has positive aspects. These would include a more liberating attitude to interpersonal (and other) relationships, greater tolerance of chaotic and unpredictable situations, a more realistic appraisal of the nature of what influences us, and a less overt desire for power.

Thus, there appears to be two opposing interpretations of the results of Rotter's I-E scale; that of Rotter who feels that "internality" is a positive goal which should be striven for, and that of Janzen and Beeken who feel that "externality" may have "positive" qualities.

This divergence of opinion is particularly interesting in the light of recent articles which state that society needs more "internal" individuals. In Psychology Today Rotter (1971) wrote:

> Our society has so many critical problems that it desperately needs as many active participating internal-minded members as possible. If feelings of external control, alienation, and powerlessness continue to grow, we may be heading for a society of drop-outs - each person sitting back watching the world go by.

Other researchers (Stephens and Delys, 1972, Stephens, 1971) agree with Rotter that society needs more "internal-minded" people. Stephens and Delys, however, go further and suggest that the educational systems should emphasize the development of internal control expectancies for young children. In light of the controversy (Rotter, 1966; Janzen & Beeken, 1973) over the positive and negative qualities of "externality" and "internality", it was felt that more investigation, as to the nature of Rotter's scale was needed. This paper is an attempt to investigate the relationship between Rotter's Internal-External scale and morality. It is an attempt to answer questions as to whether Rotter's internal individual, who is described as "active" and "participating", would be functioning at a higher level of "morality", than Rotter's external individual who is described as "docile" and "suspicious". These questions are fairly important ones to answer; particularly in light of Rotter's (1971) and Stephen's and Dely's (1972) claim that society needs more "internal-minded members".

Assuming that morality can be measured, (this assumption will be discussed more fully under chapter II), the hypothesis that this paper will attempt to investigate is that a relationship exists between Rotter's Internal-External scale and morality. Since Rotter's

I-E scale is a bi-polar scale this relationship could be in one of two directions; a direct positive correlation between a high internal score on Rotter's scale and a high level of morality, or a direct positive correlation between a high external score on Rotter's Scale and a high level of morality.

Evidence to support a relationship between "internality" and a higher level of morality is as follows:

(a) Penk (1969) found that children employing verbally mature abstractions tended to be more internal. The ability to make verbally mature abstractions would appear to facilitate the obtaining of a higher level of morality; although, this ability would not guarantee a higher moral level. Most religions employ analogy as a major device in their writings and sayings. This would imply higher levels of abstraction.

(b) Adams-Webber (1969) found that "internals" had significantly more internalized moral sanctions. This could be interpreted as meaning that "internals" have a more highly developed sense of "right and wrong" than externals. Adams-Webber implied that having more internalized moral sanctions was a positive attribute for an individual.

(c) "Internals" are also described as less dogmatic (Hjelle, 1970), less blaming, (Phares, Wilson and Klyven, 1971) and more resistant to subtle manipulation (Rotter, 1966). Also, Rotter (1966) reports that "internals" feel more in control of the environment and of themselves than do "externals". If one thinks of great religious

leaders or even people that they consider highly moral, it would probably be reasonable to state that they are less dogmatic, less blaming, more resistant to manipulation, and more in control of themselves and the environment than are people considered less moral.

(d) "Externals" have been described as feeling they are controlled by "powerful others, docile and suspicious" (Rotter, 1971). It would be hard to imagine a person functioning at a higher level of morality who was "docile, suspicious and feeling controlled by powerful others". This would seem to indicate that "externals" are functioning at a lower moral level.

While the majority of the research would indicate that "internality" is a desired quality, some researchers would question this. Indeed, they would argue that "externality" is a desired quality. Evidence to indicate this follows:

(a) Janzen, Beeken, and Hritzuk (1973) found that "external" teachers endorsed student autonomy significantly more than "internal" teachers.

(b) Janzen and Beeken (1973), summarized the positive aspects of an external locus of control as:

(i) more realistic appraisal of the nature of what influences us.
(ii) greater tolerance of chaotic and unpredictable situations.
(iii) less overt desire for power.
(iv) a more liberating to interpersonal relationships.

From Janzen and Beeken's (1973) work, it would appear that there might be a direct positive correlation between "externality" and high moral level. It could be argued that a "realistic",

"tolerant" and "liberating" external individual would be functioning at a higher level of morality than a less "realistic, tolerant and liberating" internal individual.

To summarize; this research was designed to investigate the possibility of a correlation between Rotter's I-E scale and morality, which could be in one of two possible directions:

(a) either there is a direct positive correlation between a high internal score on Rotter's I-E scale and a high level of "morality", or

(b) there is a direct positive correlation between a high external score on Rotter's I-E scale and a high level of "morality".

CHAPTER II

SELECTION OF AN INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE MORAL DEVELOPMENTS

Three possible instruments to measure moral development were found in the literature. These are as follows: Wilson's (1969), Piaget's (1960) and Kolberg's (1971) scale.

Wilson's (1969) scale was designed for use in a school. The scale is based on "moral components" with names such as "Phil", "Emp" and "Gig". Graham (1972) defines these components as follows:

(1) Phil refers to the degree with which one can identify with other people. If one cannot identify with other people, or put oneself in their place, in any degree, then it is hard to see how one can even be 'moral' in the sense of taking proper account of the feelings and interests of others.

(2) Emp refers to the ability to judge what the feelings of other people are, and to describe them correctly. Wilson suggests that one might distinguish between autempt or awareness of one's own feelings, and allemp or awareness of other's feelings.

(3) Gig refers to the fact that to make correct moral decisions 'one also needs to have a reasonable idea of what consequences one's actions will have'. A would-be helper, for example, who gives a man with a head wound a glass of spirits to revive him may both feel for the suffer and know that he would like a drink, but may be ignorant that his action may prove fatal rather than beneficial.

(4) Dik refers to the 'rational formulation of a set of rules' or moral principles to which the individual commits himself on the basis of knowledge of feelings, empathy and knowledge of the probable consequences of different possible lines of action. This requires moral decisions and judgments to be based on more or less logically consistent principles of general application and binding force.

(5) 'Phron refers to the rational formation of rules and principles. . . relating to one's own life and interests.' This implies that an ideally moral person will try to conduct his own life and affairs according to more or less consistent rational standards.

(6) Krat refers to 'the ability to translate Dik or Phron principles into action', i.e. the ability to act upon or live up to one's own principles or standards. . . The model case of a person lacking in Krat to which Wilson refers is the addict, who wishes to act otherwise, and may by no means be devoid of empathy, knowledge and rationally formulated principles, but is unable to act upon such principles. Thus, Krat is essentially a motivational-behavioural component.

The assessment of these "components" in a student is then based on the following:

1. teacher's evaluation
2. researcher's observations
3. outside contacts
4. student's friends
5. interviews and informal discussion
6. pupil's written evidence.

This scale is considered unacceptable for use in this study for the following reasons:

1. the lack of rigour and precision in the testing procedure.
2. the difficulty in administration of the tests.

The second scale to be considered was Piaget's. Piaget's scale is based on the direct observation of how children in different age groups, formulate rules. Piaget postulates that children move through three basic moral stages. During the first stage, the child uses a non-rational, authoritarian moral code which has been imposed

on him from external sources. During the final stage, the child uses a democratic code, which is based on respect for others.

Piaget's scale is significant in that it deals with conceptual factors in a developmental model. There are, however, problems involved with Piaget's scale. Some of these are as follows (Wilson, 1967):

1. it is based on small samples of Swiss children aged four to thirteen; as such, it is not certain whether the scale can be used to accurately assess older Canadian children.

2. the scale is not easily used in statistical operations.

3. the test is difficult to administer.

For these reasons, it was decided not to use Piaget's scale.

The third approach to measuring moral development is that of Kohlberg. His approach is based on both psychological evidence and philosophic argument. He has taken two prominent ideas from Piaget and Mead. These are (Kohlberg; in Beck, Crittenden, and Sullivan, 1971):

(1) development has a cognitive core (Piaget) and

(2) morality has an interactional aspect (Piaget, Mead).

In his elaboration of the above ideas Kohlberg (1971) states that:

> just as the quantitative strength of the emotional component is irrelevant to the theoretical importance of cognitive structure for understanding the development of scientific judgment, so too the quantative role of affect is relatively irrelevant for understanding the structure and development of moral judgment. . . moral judgments and norms are to be understood ultimately as universal constructions of human actors which regulate their social interaction

> rather than as passive reflections of either external states of other human beings or of internal emotions.

Under the assumption that moral development has a cognitive core and an interactional aspect, Kohlberg has developed a scale wherein the child moves through successive stages of morality, as he matures cognitively, and as he learns moral principles in order to resolve cognitive dissonance caused by new experiences in the child's interaction with others. As the child moves up the scale he develops his concept of right and wrong. To move up the scale the child's thinking must progress from concrete egocentric thinking, to thinking in terms of abstract ethical principles which center around the concept of justice.

On the basis of empirical evidence, from studies he has conducted, Kohlberg (1971) states that the stages are invariant, sequential, and cross-cultural. The individual must go through these stages. However, the individual can progress at his own speed and he can become fixated at some level. Most people stop at the conventional level. Kohlberg feels that if the child has not achieved some post-conventional thought by nineteen years, it is unlikely that he will do so in adulthood.

In order to philosophically justify that one stage is ethically higher than another, Kohlberg (1971) draws on the formal prescriptive models of Hare, and Kant, (Kohlberg; in Beck, Crittenden; and Sullivan, 1971). These models state that principled moral judgment consists of universal, prescriptive judgments which are logically related.

Kohlberg (1971) argues that as an individual moves up through his stages, from lowest to highest, the individual's moral judgments become increasing prescriptive, universal and logically related. For example, an individual at a post-conventional Kohlberg stage would use the principle of justice in his moral decisions. Kohlberg (1971) states that justice is the ultimate principle as it has the highest level of prescriptivity, and universality of all the possible moral principles (i.e. welfare concerns, utility) Also justice can be logically applied to specific moral decisions through the process of deductive reasoning. Thus, Kohlberg argues that a high level of abstract reasoning, based on prescriptivity, universality and logic, differentiate the higher levels of moral reasoning from the lower levels of moral reasoning.

A brief summary of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning (1971) follow:

KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

LEVELS	STAGES
0 Pre-moral level of development	0 Right or Wrong is simply a matter of what feels good.
1. Pre-conventional: Judgements of right and wrong correspond to a right and wrong external to the judger.	1. Physical consequences of an action determine its "goodness" or "badness". An avoidance of punishment and an unquestioning deference to power.
	2. A hedonistic orientation with beginning notions of reciprocity, but with an emphasis on an exchange of favours.
2. Conventional Level: Rule oriented behaviour.	3. A morality defined by individual ties and relationships, where approval of others is paramount.
	4. An orientation toward authority, law, duty, the maintaining of a fixed order, whether that order be secular or religious.
3. Post-Conventional: Principal thinking.	5. Social-Contract legalistic orientation. Utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and mutual obligations within an established order.
	6. Universal ethical - principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. Principles are abstract and ethical. Concern about self-condemnation for violating one's own principles.

There are, however, some criticisms of Kohlberg's Scale, one of which is the problem of scoring. Kuhmenker (1973) states three possible problems in scoring.

The first is that the scorer thinks that the content rather than the structure of the answer represents the stage criteria. Another possible problem is to think in terms of personality types rather than as ways of reasoning. A third and final problem is that the kinds of judgment that delineate the stages may be present in all the stages to a greater or less degree. These problems are inherent in inter-rater scoring consistency. While these criticisms of Kohlberg's scale may be justified, it is hoped that by using two separate markers, some of these problems will be decreased.

Another criticism that could be raised is the validity of the philosophic argument Kohlberg uses to justify that one stage requires a higher level of moral judgement than another. In his justification, Kohlberg has combined some aspects of intuitive and prescriptive moral theory. It may be that the two theories are not logically compatible. Kohlberg recognizes this fact when he states "that universality is always purchased at the price of ignoring unique elements of human welfare and human justice in the concrete situation" (Kohlberg, 1971).

In summary, the writer feels that the Kohlberg scale presents the best available instrument ot measure moral judgment. Kohlberg's scale incorporates Piaget's cognitive-development model of morality, and at the same time it remedies some of the deficiencies in Piaget's own scale. Some of the advantages of Kohlberg's scale over Piaget's are as follows:

1. Kohlberg's scale has a wider social base than Piaget's. This will be elaborated on in the following paragraphs.

2. Kohlberg's samples include older age groups.

3. Kohlberg's scale by going beyond the socialization theory (Piaget; in Graham, 1972) of moral development, allows for the development of an autonomous morality (Wilson, 1967).

With reference to the social base of Kohlberg's scale, it is relevant to point out that studies of children in America, Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, and Yucatan provide a wider basis of comparison than Piaget's scale which is based mainly on Swiss children. This is an important dimension in measuring "morality". A scale that has been based on many cultures can reduce some of the specific cultural biases of a particular society.

It is also important that a wide range of ages be considered in the construction of a morality scale. Development of morality does not stop at a specific age. Kohlberg's scale is more adequate than Piaget's scale in this respect since it is based on people up to the age of 24, whereas Piaget's scale is only based on children up to the age of 13.

Finally, Kohlberg's scale goes beyond a socialization theory of moral development. This is necessary since a socialisation theory can only account for a moral judgment based on social interaction. For example, a socialization model can account for a child who ceases to be totally egocentric and becomes aware of other prople's needs. Simply put, the child finds that he must

try to understand and respond to other people or suffer the consequences. A socialization theory, however, cannot account for a spiritual leader or artist who effectively ignores most other people and who lives according to certain principles that he has decided on. In short, a socialization theory cannot explain the development of an autonomous morality in individuals who appear to go beyond conventional moral norms. Piaget's theory is a socialization theory in that the child gradually "decenters" himself through contact with others; Kohlberg's theory, on the other hand, acknowledges the socialization factor in its lower levels, but also allows for an autonomous morality (i.e. a spiritual leader) at its higher levels.

It is for the above reasons that Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental scale was selected as the best available method of measuring moral development.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH POSTULATE, HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE

POSTULATE

According to the empirical evidence given by Rotter (1966, 1971) and others (Adams-Webber, 1969; Clouser and Hjelle, 1970; Phares, Wilson, and Klyver, 1971), there is a possibility that those individuals who score high on Rotter's Internal Scale are using a type of moral reasoning that would be found at a conventional or post-conventional stage as measured by Kohlberg's (1971) scale of moral development. On the other hand, there is some evidence (Jansen, Beaken, and Britzuk, 1973) which would indicate a possibility that those individuals who score high on Rotter's External Scale are using the type of moral reasoning that would be found at Kohlberg's conventional or post-conventional levels. This study is designed to test these postulates.

HYPOTHESES

NULL HYPOTHESIS:

1. There will be no statistically significant correlation between scores on the Rotter I-E Scale and scores on Kohlberg's moral development scale.

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES:

2. There will be a significant positive correlation found between those individuals scoring high on Rotter's Internal Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6.

3. There will be a significant positive correlation found between those individuals scoring high on Rotter's External Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6.

RATIONALE

Evidence to support a relationship between individual's scoring high on Rotter's Internal Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5, and 6 is as follows:

(a) Penk (1969) found that children employing verbally mature abstractions tended to be more internal. As such these children should utilize types of moral reasoning found at the higher levels of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental model. The "internal" children should be more able to formulate "self-chosen ethical principles appealing to comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency." These principles should also be "more abstract and ethical."

(b) Adams-Webber (1969) found that "internals" had more internalized moral sanctions. Again this should be found at Kohlberg's higher levels where "right is defined by a decision of conscience" as opposed to the lower levels where right is defined "by the physical consequences of an action."

(c) "Internals" are also found to be less dogmatic (Hjelle, 1970), less blaming (Phares, Wilson and Klyver, 1971), and more resistant to subtle manipulation (Rotter, 1966). These factors plus the fact that "internals" feel themselves more in control of the environment and themselves (Rotter, 1966) would suggest that "internals" were functioning at a more principled ethical level (i.e. a higher Kohlberg stage), as opposed to "externals" who feel that they are less in control of the environment. The "external" should be found in the lower stages of Kohlberg's scale where "judgments of right and wrong correspond to a right and wrong external to the judger."

(d) "Externals" have been described as feeling they are controlled by powerful others, docile and suspicious. This would suggest a lower stage of moral reasoning in which there was "an instrumental view of punishment as to serve the interests of the judge, the victim or the culprit. Punishment merely expresses the authorities' anger."

The other possibility is that there is a direct positive correlation between individuals scoring high on Rotter's External Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6. Evidence to support this follows:

(a) Janzen, Beeken, and Hritzuk (1973) found that "external" teachers endorsed student autonomy significantly more than "internal" teachers. This may suggest that "external" teachers are functioning at a higher ethical level and they are more concerned with "general individual rights."

(b) Janzen and Beeken (1973) summarize the positive aspects of an external locus of control as:

(i) more realistic appraisal of the nature of what influences us

(ii) greater tolerance of chaotic and unpredictable situations

(iii) less overt desire for power

(iv) a more liberating attitude to interpersonal relationships.

It is postulated that an "external" individual, who is more tolerant, and more liberating would have more respect for "individual rights", hence, he would be functioning at a higher ethical level as measured by Kohlberg's scale.

CHAPTER IV

METHOD AND RESULTS

SAMPLES

Two samples of 20 high school students each were tested. The initial sample consisted of 12 girls and 8 boys at St. Mary's Separate School in Edmonton. The students in the initial sample had a mean age of 16.8 years and they were attending a grade 11 psychology class. The students were a streamlined group who had trouble with academic work. The school was located in a lower socioeconomic region of the city.

Since the sample was small and from a relatively homogenous group, it was decided to repeat the experiment with a different sample. This was in an attempt to remove possible biases due to sample size, intellectual ability, religion or socioeconomic class.

The second sample consisted of 11 girls and 9 boys attending Eastglen High School in Edmonton. The mean age of the students was 17.2 years. They were attending a grade 12 mathematics class. The school was located in a middle and upper socio-economic region of the city.

ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING

To determine the relationship, if any, between the Rotter and Kohlberg scales, the subjects in both samples were required to fill out the Rotter I-E scale (Appendix A) and nine of the Kohlberg moral dilemmas (Appendix B).

Reliability in marking the Kohlberg scales posed a problem due to the complex nature of the scoring. In the first sample only one marker was used; hence, interjudge reliability was not an issue. It was felt by the writer that the marker was very reliable, as she was a trained Kohlberg scorer and as she had a great deal of experience in scoring Kohlberg scales.

In the second sample, two Kohlberg markers were used, instead of one, in order to check on the interjudge reliability. Using the Kuder-Richardson Formula 20, a reliability index of 0.80 was calculated. This coefficient would be somewhat low since one scorer was experienced, and the other scorer was not. The naive scorer was the experimenter who had not taken a training course for Kohlberg markers, and who just relied on the scoring manual. In light of this, it was decided to use the experienced scorer's marks for subsequent analysis.

PROCEDURE

For each student a score from Kohlberg's global scale and an "internal"score from Rotter's scale, were calculated. A "global" score referred to Kohlberg's more general form of analysis (global analysis) as opposed to his more complex and specific item analysis. An "internal" score in Rotter's scale was defined as the total possible score minus the "external" score. The "external" score was the score that was taken directly from the test (see Appendix A).

The data was then subjected to a one-way analysis of variance and an F ratio was calculated. The internal score was used as the dependent variable. A one-way analysis of variance was used as the experimenter felt that the Kohlberg scale was not equal interval scale, due to the fact that the stages are qualitatively different.

RESULTS

This study had its main postulate that those individuals who score high on Rotter's Internal Scale are using a type of moral reasoning that would be found at conventional or post-conventional stages as measured by Kohlberg's (1971) scale of moral development. The major hypothesis (p. 30) in null form stated that there will be no significant correlation between scores on the Rotter I-E Scale and scores on Kohlberg's moral development scale. The alternative hypotheses stated the direction of a possible correlation between Rotter's and Kohlberg's scales. Hypothesis 2 stated that there would be a significant positive correlation found between those individuals scoring high on Rotter's Internal Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6. Hypothesis 3 states that there would be a significant positive correlation found between those individuals scoring high on Rotter's External Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6.

In both samples, two scores were obtained from each of the students. One score was a number between 1 and 23. This represented

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the Rotter "Internal" Score. The higher the score, the more internal the individual was according to Rotter's scale. The other score was the Kohlberg stage. The stages varied from 1 to 5. In the population studied, there were not any individuals who used a stage 6 level of moral reasoning.

In the following pages, tables 1 to 3 and figure 1 represent sample 1. Tables 4 - 6 and figure 2 represent sample 2.

TABLE I

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROTTER'S INTERNAL SCORES AND KOHLBERG'S STAGES FOR A SAMPLE OF 12 GIRLS AND 8 BOYS IN GRADES 11 AT ST. MARY'S HIGH SCHOOL, 1974.

	KOHLBERG STAGE				
	1	2	3	4	5
ROTTER "INTERNAL" SCORE (LISTED UNDER KOHLBERG STAGES)		5	6	10	5
		11	8	11	15
		11	9	15	
		13	9		
		14	11		
			15		
			15		
			16		
			16		
n		5	10	3	2



FIGURE 1

GRAPH SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL SCORES AND KOHLBERG STAGES FOR 20 ST. MARY'S STUDENTS (FROM TABLE 1)

TABLE 2

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ROTTER INTERNAL SCORES BETWEEN DIFFERENT KOHLBERG STAGES FOR 20 ST. MARY'S STUDENTS

Source of Variation	SS	MS	DF	F	P
Group	11.25	3.75	3	0.24	*0.867
Error	249.7	15.61	16		
Total	260.95	19.36	19		

* P NS at .05 level

TABLE 3

NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON BETWEEN ORDERED MEANS FOR KOHLBERG'S STAGES

	Kohlberg Stage	3	4	2	5
Kohlberg Stage	Rotter Means	12.100	12.000	10.800	10.000
5	10.000	2.100	2.000	0.800	0.0
2	10.800	1.300	1.200	0.0	
4	12.000	0.100	0.0		
3	12.100	0.0			
Critical Value of Difference of 2 Means:		8.5	7.6	6.3	

TABLE 4

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROTTER'S INTERNAL SCORES AND KOHLBERG'S STAGES FOR A SAMPLE OF 11 GIRLS AND 9 BOYS, GRADE 12, EASTGLEN HIGH SCHOOL, 1974.

	KOHLBERG STAGE				
	1	2	3	4	5
ROTTER "INTERNAL" SCORE (LISTED UNDER KOHLBERG STAGES)		9	10	14	
		13	18	10	
		12	8	12	
		14	19		
		10	11		
		6	15		
		15	8		
			10		
			15		
			17		
		7	10	13	



FIGURE 2

GRAPH SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL SCORES AND KOHLBERG STAGES FOR 20 EASTGLEN STUDENTS. (FROM TABLE 4)

TABLE 5

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ROTTER INTERNAL SCORES BETWEEN DIFFERENT KOHLBERG STAGES FOR 20 ST. MARY'S STUDENTS.

SOURCE	SS	MS	DF	F	P
GROUPS	13.87	6.94	2.	0.53	*0.600504
ERROR	224.3	13.20	17.		
TOTAL	238.17	20.14	19		

* P NS at .05 level

TABLE 6

NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON BETWEEN ORDERED MEANS FOR TABLE 5 FOR KOHLBERG'S STAGES

	KOHLBERG STAGE	3	4	2
KOHLBERG STAGE	MEANS	13.100	12.000	11.286
2	11.826	1.814	0.714	0.0
4	12.000	1.100	0.0	
3	13.100	0.0		
CRITICAL VALUE OF DIFFERENCE OF TWO MEANS:		5.77	4.75	

SAMPLE ONE

The first hypothesis to be considered was the following:

HO: there will be no significant correlation between scores on the Rotter I-E scale and scores on Kohlberg's moral development scale.

Table 1 shows the relationship between Rotter's internal scores and Kohlberg's stages for a sample of 12 girls and 8 boys in a grade 11 psychology class, at St. Mary's High School in Edmonton. For the purpose of a one-way analysis of variance (see Table 1), the table has been set-up in columns according to the Kohlberg stage.

The Rotter internal score was listed as the dependent variable under its respective Kohlberg stage. For example, the number 5 under the Kohlberg stage 2 represents an individual who scored 5 on the Rotter internal scale and who fell into the second stage of moral reasoning as measured by the Kohlberg scale.

The homogeneity of variance in table 1, using a chi-squared test, was found to have a probability of 0.7104. This is well within the range of a normal distribution.

To help clarify the relationship between the Kohlberg stage and the Rotter internal score, the data from table 1 was also compiled on a graph. In figure 1, an individual's score on the Internal Rotter scale was plotted on the ordinate. An individual's stage of moral reasoning, as measured by the Kohlberg scale, was

plotted on the abscissa. A point on the graph represented an individual's Internal Rotter score relative to his Kohlberg moral stage. As can be seen from the graph (Figure 1), there does not appear to be any significant relationship between an individual's score on the Rotter scale and his score on the Kohlberg scale. This is indeed what was found when the data was subjected to a one-way analysis of variance (Table 2).

From table 2, it can be seen that the probability of obtaining a change distribution similar to the one in figure 1 and table 1 was 0.867; thus, it would appear that there were no significant relationships, in the first sample, between an individual's score on Rotter's internal scale and his score on Kohlberg's scale.

To investigate whether there were any significant differences between the Rotter's score means for the Kohlberg stages, a Newman-Keuls Comparison between ordered means (Table 3) was used. In table 3, the mean Rotter internal score, for each of the Kohlberg stages, was found. These means were found to be 10.8, 12.1, 12.0, 10.0 for Kohlberg's stages 2, 3, 4, 5 respectively. In the Newman-Keuls Comparison (Table 3), it was found that there were no cases where there was a significant difference between the Rotter score means for the Kohlberg stages. In no case did the studentized range exceed the critical value of difference for the two means, (i.e. in table 3), neither 2.1, 1.3 nor 0.1 exceeded the critical difference 8.5). Again, this would indicate that there were no significant relationships between the Rotter & Kohlberg scales. As a result, the null hypothesis must be accepted for sample 1.

Also it should be noted that there were no significant trends for the Rotter scores in the various Kohlberg stages as shown by the Newman-Keuls analysis (Table 3). In all cases the studentized range was too far below the critical difference, for the Rotter means in any stage to approach significance.

SAMPLE TWO

The first hypothesis to be considered is the following:

HO: There will be no significant correlation between scores on the Rotter I-E scale and scores on Kohlberg's moral development scale.

Table 4 shows the relationship between the Rotter internal scores and the Kohlberg stages for a sample of 11 girls and 9 boys, in a grade 12 mathematics class at Eastglen High School in Edmonton. This table has been set-up similarly to table 1 (see explanation above).

The homogeneity of variance was found to have a probability of .8. This is well within the range of a normal distribution. The data from table 4 was also compiled on a graph (figure 2). As in figure 1, an individual's internal Rotter score was plotted against the ordinate with his Kohlberg stage plotted against the abscissa. As can be seen from figure 2, there did not appear to be any significant relationships between an individual's score on the Rotter scale and his score on the Kohlberg scale.

From table 5, it can be seen that the probability of obtaining, by chance, this distribution was 0.60. This was not significant. Thus, it would appear that there were no significant relationships, in the second sample, between an individual's score on Rotter's internal scale and his score on Kohlberg's scale.

As would be expected with such a large probability, there were no significant differences between the Rotter score means for the Kohlberg stages (Table 6). In no case did the studentized range exceed the critical value of difference for the two means. Again, this would indicate that there was no significant relationship between the two scales. Thus, the null hypothesis must be accepted for sample 2.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This research has been guided by the postulate that those individuals who score high on Rotter's Internal Scale are using a type of moral reasoning that would be found at a conventional or post-conventional stage, as measured by Kohlberg's (1971) scale of moral development. From this postulate was derived the hypothesis that there will be a statistically significant correlation between scores on the Rotter I-E scale and scores on Kohlberg's moral development scale. Empirical evidence to support this comes from Rotter (1966, 1971) and others (Adams-Webber, 1969; Penk, 1969; Phares, Wilson, and Klyver, 1971). These researchers picture the "internal", as compared to the external as:

1. more resistant to subtle manipulation and more in control of the environment and themselves, (Rotter, 1966, 1971).

2. having more internalized moral sanctions (Adams-Weber, 1969).

3. employing more verbally mature abstractions (Penk, 1969).

4. and being less blaming (Phares, Wilson and Klyver, 1971).

These statements were interpreted to mean that the "internal" would score higher on the Kohlberg scale; indicating that the internal was using a more "principled" form of moral reasoning.

Contradictory evidence concerning Rotter's "internal" and "external" individuals came from Janzen and Beeken (1973). They

postulated that the "external" as compared to the "internal":

(1) has a more realistic appraisal of what influences him.

(2) has greater tolerance of unpredictable situations.

(3) has less overt desire for power.

(4) is more liberating in interpersonal relationships.

Janzen and Beeken's postulates were interpreted to mean that the "external" would score higher on the Kohlberg scale; indicating that the "external" was using a more "principled" form of moral reasoning. Janzen and Beeken (1973), however, also point out that there are still many problems connected with locus of control studies. They feel that there are many pre-conceptions involved in the design and interpretation of many locus of control experiments. If this is true, there may be no relationships between Rotter's Locus of Control Scale and Kohlberg's Scale of Moral Development.

To test the postulate that Rotter's internal individuals would be functioning at Kohlberg's conventional or post-conventional levels of moral reasoning, the following hypotheses were advanced:

HO: There will be no statistically significant correlation between scores on the Rotter I-E Scale and scores on Kohlberg's moral development scale.

H1: There will be a significant positive correlation found between those individuals scoring high on Rotter's Internal Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6.

H2: There will be a significant positive correlation found between those individuals scoring high on Rotter's External Scale and Kohlberg's stages 3, 4, 5 and 6.

In spite of having samples from different socioeconomic classes, from different achievement levels, and from different school systems, the results were the same: there were no significant relationships between Rotter's Locus of Control Scale and Kohlberg's stages of moral development; thus, the null hypothesis was accepted.

Before considering the implications, these results have for the claims made about Rotter's scale, it is necessary to consider the limitations of this study. First, the study only involved a relatively small sample of 40 high school students. All the students came from senior grades in two high schools in Edmonton. Only 2 of the students were reasoning at a stage 5 level as measured by Kohlberg's scale. There were no individuals using a Stage 6 level of moral reasoning. There was also the possibility of errors in measurement, in the scoring of the Kohlberg scale. Only one marker was used to score the Kohlberg scale in the first sample. The above limitations make it difficult to generalize beyond the samples studied; thus, the results should be viewed with caution.

What implications, then do these results have for the claims made about Rotter's scale? If the I-E scale measures verbal abstraction, internalized moral sanctions, feelings of control, general activity, dogmatism, resistance to manipulation, tolerance, personal relationships, and assessment of forces that influence us, why then is there no relationship with the development of moral judgment as measured by Kohlberg's scale? How can these results be explained?

If children employing verbally mature abstractions tend to be "internal" (Pank, 1969) and if, as you proceed up Kohlberg's scale, the principles used in making judgments become "more abstract and ethical", why then is there no relationships between the Rotter and Kohlberg scales? One possible explanation may be that even though Rotter's "internal" is employing more "verbal abstractions", the abstractions are not more "ethical". Perhaps the abstractions are merely in the form of higher level rationalizations; thus, the "internals" would not be concentrated at Kohlberg's higher levels.

The fact that "internals" had more internalized moral sanctions (Adams-Webber, 1969), but were not using significantly higher levels of moral judgment may be explained by postulating that individuals using higher levels of moral judgment may have no great need for internalized moral sanctions, or at least by saying that higher level moral judgment does not require more internalized moral sanctions. Also it may be that dogmatism, blaming, resistance to manipulation, and feelings of being in control are not relevant to moral judgment as measured by Kohlberg's scale. This in turn would raise the question as to whether a person using stage six moral judgment as well as a person using stage one moral judgment, as measured by Kohlberg's scale, could be dogmatic, blaming, resistant to manipulation, and having feelings of being in control. Similarly, there may be the possibility that individuals using stage one or stage six in moral judgment could be both "docile and suspicious".

Perhaps moral judgment and moral behaviour are not related. It may be that Kohlberg's scale measures only moral judgment; whereas, Rotter's scale measures personality factors that are highly correlated with behaviour. These questions are yet to be answered.

With regard to Jansen and Beeken's (1973) external teacher who respects "individual rights" and allows his students more autonomy than the internal teacher, how can it be explained that he is not necessarily operating at a higher level of moral judgment; particularly when Kohlberg's higher stages are based on an increased respect for human rights. Perhaps this teacher may be operating at a higher level of moral judgment; however, the counter argument, that the teacher is allowing the students' autonomy through his lack of control, is equally possible.

The above discussion was based on the premise that Rotter's and Kohlberg's scales are valid (i.e. they are measuring what they purport to measure). It is possible that one or both scales are not valid. In Rotter's scale one could question whether it is measuring a single dimension. If "internality-externality" is not a single stable dimension found on a continuum, it would be very hard to compare individuals in regard to "internality-externality", at different points on the scale. As Jansen and Beeken (1973) have pointed out, there is a great danger of applying pre-conceptions to the design and interpretation of locus of control experiments. In other words there is a danger of endowing the measure with the intended "measured" meanings of the concept. The theoretical basis

Rotter's scale still needs investigation.

As such, it may be premature for Rotter (1971) and Stephens and Delys (1972), to claim that society needs more "internal" individuals. Even if the "internal" has the positive qualities that Rotter (1971) claims, and this is by no means certain, as the study by Janzen and Beeken (1973) has indicated, the writer would argue that what society needs may not be more alert, skillful, achievement oriented, and environmental controlling "internals" (Rotter, 1966), but more people capable of "higher" moral judgment. It should be noted that Hitler could be described as alert, skillful, achievement oriented and environment controlling; however, few people would argue that he was capable of "higher" moral judgment. Perhaps as Janzen and Beeken (1973) note, Rotter's scale would be more useful in the field of learning, and not personality.

One further question should be asked. Stephens and Delys (1972) have argued that young children should be trained to be "internal". The question is, "Do we have the right to attempt to train a child to be "internal"?

In summary, the results of this experiment indicate that there are no statistically significant relationships between Rotter's Locus of Control Scale and Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental scale of moral judgment. This study, however, raises more questions than it answers: Are Kohlberg's and Rotter's claims about their scales valid? What are the moral implications of Rotter's claims? Have we

the right to train people to be "internal" or "external"?

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:

This study has just touched on the problem of possible relationships between Rotter's Internal-External Scale and morality. There are many possibilities for further research. A few of these follow:

1. A replication of this study using larger samples and older age groups.

2. Find a sample of individuals using stage 5 and 6 levels of moral reasoning as measured by Kohlberg's scale and test whether they are "internal" or "external" as compared to individuals using conventional and pre-conventional moral reasoning.

3. Test for correlations between Piaget's scales of moral judgment (1932) and cognitive development (1952) and Rotter's I-E scale.

4. Test for correlations between moral behaviour and Rotter's I-E scale. Wilson's (1969) scale could be used to measure moral behaviour.

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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE I-E SCALE

This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain important events in our society affect different people. Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually beleive to be more true rather than the one you think you should choose or the one you would like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief: obviously there are no right or wrong answers.

Your answers to the items on this inventory are to be recorded on a separate answer sheet which is loosely inserted in the booklet. REMOVE THIS ANSWER SHEET NOW. Print your name and any other information requested by the examiner on the answer sheet, then finish reading these directions. Do not open the booklet until you are told to do so.

Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Find the number of the item on the answer sheet and black-in the space under the number 1 or 2 which you choose as the statement more true.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Also try to respond to each item independently when making your choice; do not be influenced by your previous choices.

TABLE 1

THE I-E SCALE

1.	a.	Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.	a
	b.	The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.	b
2.	a.	Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.	a
	b.	People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.	b
3.	a.	One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.	a
	b.	There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.	b
4.	a.	In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.	a
	b.	Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.	b
5.	a.	The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.	a
	b.	Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.	b
6.	a.	Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.	a
	b.	Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.	b

7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. a b

   b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.

8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality. a b

   b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.

9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. a b

   b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.

10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. a b

    b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.

11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it. a b

    b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions. a b

    b. The world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. a b

    b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.

14. a. There are certain people who are just no good. a b

    b. There is some good in everybody.

15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. a b

    b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first. a b

    b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it.

17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control. a b

    b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.

18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings. a b

    b. There really is no such thing as "luck".

19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. a b

    b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. a b

b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.

21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones. a b

b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. a b

b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give. a b

b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do. a b

b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me. a b

b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.

26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. a b

b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.

27. a.	There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.	a	b
b.	Team sports are an excellent way to build character.		
28. a.	What happens to me is my own doing.	a	b
b.	Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.		
29. a.	Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.	a	b
b.	In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.		

EDUCATION
BELFAST BOND
SUBSCRIPTION

APPENDIX B

Name _____ I.D. Number _____

Ave _____ Sex _____

DECISION STORIES AND QUESTIONS

On the following pages you will find several stories each of which are followed by some questions. The purpose of these stories and questions is to get at your opinions and ideas. Please write down <u>all</u> the ideas or feelings they bring to mind rather than giving "Yes" or "No" answers. Just writing "Yes" or "No" is definitely not an adequate answer. You should always give your reasons for your answer.

You are to write your answers in the spaces provided following each question. If you need more space you may write on the back of the page, but if you do make sure you specify which question you are answering. You should be able to answer most of the questions in the space that is provided.

Remember that this is not a test in the usual sense. There are no right or wrong answers. There can only be different ideas and opinions about these stories. So, do not spend a long time thinking about how to answer any one question, but simply write down what your opinions and ideas are about it.

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charges $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz have done that? Was it actually wrong or right? Why?

Is it a husband's duty to steal the drug for his wife if he can get it no other way? Would a good husband do it?

Did the druggist have the right to charge that much when there was no law actually setting a limit to the price? Why?

<u>Answer the next two questions if you think he should steal the drug</u>

If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his wife, should he steal the drug?

Suppose it wasn't Heinz's wife who was dying of cancer but it was Heinz's best friend. His friend didn't have any money and there was no one in his family willing to steal the drug. Should Heinz steal the drug for his friend in that case? Why?

Answer the next two questions only if you think Heinz should not steal the drug

Would you steal the drug to save your wife's life?

If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough, would you steal the drug to save your own life?

Everyone should answer the remaining question

Heinz broke in the store and stole the drug and gave it to his wife. He was caught and brought before the judge. Should the judge send Heinz to jail for stealing or should he let him go free? Why?

Everyone should continue here

The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the doctor knew that she had only about 6 months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of a pain-killer like ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months anyway.

Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that will make her die? Why?

Answer the following questions only if you think the doctor should not give her the drug

Would you blame the doctor for giving her the drug?

What would have been the best for the woman herself, to have had her life for six months more in great pain or have died sooner? Why?

Some countries have a law that doctors could put away a suffering person who will die anyway. Should the doctor do it in that case?

Everyone should answer the remaining questions

The doctor finally decided to kill the woman to put her out of her pain, so he did it without consulting the law. The police found out and the doctor was brought up on a charge of murder even though they knew the woman had asked him. What punishment should the judge give the doctor? Why?

Would it be right or wrong to give the doctor the death sentence?

Do you believe that the death sentence should be given in some cases?

The law prescribes the death penalty for treason against the country. Do you think the death sentence should be given for treason? Why?

While all this was happening, Heinz was in jail for breaking in and trying to steal the medicine. He had been sentenced for 10 years. But after a couple of years, he escaped from the prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for work in curing cancer. Twenty years had passed when a tailor recognized the factory owner as being Heinz, the escaped convict whom the police had been looking for back in his home town.

Should the tailor report Heinz to the police? Would it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?

Is it a citizen's duty to report Heinz? Would it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?

If Heinz was a good friend of the tailor, would that make a difference? Why?

Should Heinz be sent back to jail by the judge? Why?

Joe is a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?

Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money? Why?

Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son? Why?

Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking a promise to his father? Why?

Joe wanted to go to camp but he was afraid to refuse to give his father the money. So he gave his father $10 and told him that was all he made. He took the other $40 and paid for camp with it. He told his father the head of the camp said he could pay later. So he went off to camp, and the father didn't go on the fishing trip.

Before Joe went to camp, he told his older brother, Alexander, that he really made $50 and that he lied to his father and said he'd made $10. Alexander wonders whether he should tell his father or not.

Should Alexander, the older brother, tell their father that Joe had lied about the money or should he keep quiet about what Joe had done? Why?

Why should a teenager think he shouldn't tell on a friend or a brother?

Which is more important, being a loyal son or a loyal brother? Why?

If the father finds out, should he punish Joe for lying and going off with the money? Why?

Several years later, the grown-up brothers had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Alex the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Joe, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Joe told the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Joe very well, he loaned him the money. So Joe and Alex skipped town, each with $500.



If you had to say who did worse, would you say Al did worse to break in the store and steal the $500 or Joe did worse to borrow the $500 with no intention of paying it back? Why?

Would you feel like a worse person stealing like Al or cheating like Joe? Why?

Why shouldn't someone steal from a store anyhow?

Who would feel worse, the storeowner who was robbed or the man who was cheated out of the loan? Why?

Which should the law be more harsh or strong against, stealing like Al or cheating like Joe? Why?

In Korea a company of Marines was 'way outnumbered and was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy were coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive; there would be about a 4 to 1 chance he would be killed. The captain himself is the man who knows best who should go back and do the job. The captain himself is the man who knows best how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If he goes himself, the man will probably not get back safely and he is the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

Should the captain order a man to go on this very dangerous mission or should he go himself? Why?

Does the captain have the right to order a man if he thinks it best to? Why?

Which would be best for the survival of all the men, ordering a man or the captain going himself?

If he were absolutely certain that many more lives would be lost if he went himself and were killed, should he order another man to go against his will? Why?

Would a man have the right to refuse such an order? Why?

The captain finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. One of the men he thought of was one who had a lot of strength and courage but he was a bad trouble maker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them up and he wouldn't do his work. The second man he thought of had gotten a bad disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was strong enoung to do the job.

Should the captain send the trouble maker or the sick man? Why?

Who would it be fairer to send? Why?

Would it be fair to send the trouble maker as a punishment? Why?

Whose life would be worth more the company? Why?

During the war in Europe, a city was often bombed by the enemy. So each man in the city was given a post he was to go to right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started and to rescue people in the burning buildings. A man named Diesing was made the chief in charge of one fire engine post. The post was near where he worked so he could get there quickly during the day, but it was a long way from his home. One day there was a very heavy bombing and Diesing left the shelter in the place he worked and went toward his fire station. But when he saw how much of the city was burning he got worried about his family. So he decided he had to go home first to see if his family was safe, even though his home was a long way off and the station was nearby and there was somebody assigned to protect his family's area.

Was it right or wrong for Diesing to leave his station to protect his family? Why?

Suppose Diesing were just a volunteer and wasn't paid, would that make a difference? Why?

Suppose other men were leaving for their families. Would that make a difference? Why?

Suppose it were against the law to leave one's post and only a few men besides Diesing did it. Should Diesing be punished? Why?

APPENDIX C

Global Rating Guide

Sample Situation - Heinz Stealing Drugs

Type 1 - Oriented to (fearful) avoidance of stealing and punishment

1. Value. Syntelic and projective value comparison - the wife is valuable; more valuable than the drug - qua more important. The badness of stealing may focus on the value of the drug.

2. Choice. May not go beyond labeling to identify with actor's dilemma. If does, may see him as unable to change outcome of situation. Says shouldn't steal.

3. Sanction. Strong concern about punishment. May see it as inevitable. May see punishment as leading to further harm to wife or making drug useless.

4. Stealing Rule. Stealing is a bad, punishable act, breaking the law (as activating police).

5. Husband role. No sense of husband's role obligation in this context.

6. Injustice. May think druggist will be punished for withholding the drug or for shooting the husband. In any case, does not see druggist's action withholding as justifying the husband's action, or as relevant to it.

Type 2 - Oriented to instrumental necessity of stealing

1. Value. "The ends justify the means. Says has to, is best to, or is right to steal, to prevent wife from dying. (Without an implication that saving the wife is a good deed).

2. Choice. Little conflict in decision to steal. Implies decision is based on instrumental reasoning or impulse.

3. Sanction. Little concern about punishment, or punishment may be avoided by repayment, etc.

4. Rule. Little concern about stealing in this situation. May see stealing in this situation as not hurting the druggist.

5. Husband role. Orientation to a family member or a relative whom one needs and is identified with. May be an act of exchange, but not of sacrifice or duty.

8. Injustice. Druggist's cheating "makes it natural to steal." However, not actually indignant at the druggist, who may be seen as within his rights to charge whatever he wants.

Type 3 - Oriented to bring a good family person in context where stealing would not be too disapproved. Stealing justified either because it's natural a loving husband would, or because of provocation by mean behavior of the druggist.

1. Value. Intentions concern. Act justified because of the great and natural concern of the husband and his desperateness in the situation.

2. Choice. Indecisive as to right and wrong, but a natural action the self and most people would do. Focus is on the not disapproving, not on a categorical decision about the act. May insist some way society will solve problem.

3. Sanction. Says that other people wouldn't disapprove, or that the self wouldn't - that court may be lenient.

4. Stealing rule. More concern than Type 1 that stealing is bad in the situation. Husband is willing to do anything, "really desperate.

5. Husband role. Most or any husband would love his wife enough to do it. Shouldn't steal for a friend because don't like a friend that much (to risk jail).

8. Justice. Orientation to druggist as a mean or selfish person.

Type 4 - A categorical attitude toward stealing in conflict with some sense of responsibility for life and some indignation at druggist.

1. Value. Acknowledgment of the importance of the end, of the extremeness of the situation, e.g., a life is at stake. (In Type 1, there was an actual comparison of the importance of a life vs. of the drug, not a reaction to the urgency of the situation.) Makes a demand for certainty before stealing.

2. Choice. To some extent, sees act of stealing as one of desperation, loss of control. Some distrust of the emotional reaction of the natural self. Says no at first but may waiver, decide should steal.

3. Sanction. No mention of punishment as a sanction. May be a concern for restoring gestures to undo the wrong of stealing.

4. Rule. Some categorization of stealing as always wrong. A resistance to making exceptions to rules. A possible invocation of harming the druggist or his property rights. It is as if a decision had been made in the past that "stealing is wrong" and the decision cannot be changed for this case.

5. Husband role. A sense of obligation to the wife independent of affection, being good, etc. May be defined as delegated duty to protect, as unlimited responsibility for the safety of someone or something in one's care.

6. Justice. Some indignation against the druggist, but this does not legitimize stealing. May believe druggist is within his rights to gain the rewards of his labor.

Type 5 - Oriented to the law itself to some extent an "arbitrary" discounting of the individual situation.

1. Value. The ends, situation, does not justify the means.

2. Choice. The conflcit is between the legal judgment and what anyone, the rational individual would do, or is justified in doing. Expects that the legal social system could not allow such a dilemma to arise. Though "wrong" legally, tendency to say should steal.

3. Sanction. Orientation to law beyond the punishment it would involve. From the point of view of rational prudence, should risk jail.

4. Rule. Oriented to the legal judgment in this particular case, rather than the weight of the concept of stealing.

5. Role. Duty to wife is within and limited by the general legal framework. A wife should not expect a husband to steal. However, a rational and natural person would prefer stealing and jail to loss of wife, in a case like that.

8. Justice. Druggist still has his legal rights, regardless of his unfairness. The unfairness of the druggist is irrelevant to the legal and rational decision, though it is perceived.

Type 5' - 6 - Perceive all Type 5 features but more willingness to see action as actually right on the side of the values of the situation and justice.

1. Value. Emphasis on value of a life.

2. Choice process. Though the act is legally wrong, it is justified right to the rational and good actor under these narrow conditions.

5. Role. If absolutely necessary, would do it for a friend, etc.

8. Justice. No justice on the druggist's side in a case of life, a sense that druggist is violating rights of life. Society (or the druggist) has no right to maintain the rights of property at the expense of the right to life.